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The Iranian Internet Evolution
Foreword by John Kelly
Before we published our 2008 Berkman Center study, the Iranian blogosphere was
described by experts as a place where young democrats opposed the regime. Articles,
books, and interviews said this and little more about it. Its size and vitality were
asserted, but as details highlighting a political vision of democratic shoots struggling up
through the (hopefully melting) ice of authoritarianism. Spring was on its way.
Our study did not contradict this story, but the application of network analysis and
statistical clustering to a huge corpus of actual Iranian weblog data showed that the
young democrats were just one part of a larger network that contained many other
kinds of Iranian bloggers. Unexpectedly, we discovered dense networks of conservative
political and religious bloggers every bit as active online as the young democrats (who,
as it turned out, also included a number of older expatriates). In some ways, the side
of the Iranian blogosphere favoring the Iranian regime was more interesting than the
opposition. Within it there were clear subgroups, such as the “CyberShia” who focused
mainly on religion, and others who focused on insider politics from a conservative point
of view. While all of these supported the Supreme Leader, some liked Ahmadinejad and
some hated him. The divisions and arguments among conservatives revealed how Iran
was no run-of-the-mill autocracy, but a hotbed of competing factions each with their
agendas, supporters and advocates.
Beyond politics, there were also large clusters around cultural topics, notably Persian
poetry and literature. The alignment of these clusters in the network showed cultural
divisions that extended beyond overt politics. In Iran, which 14th Century poet you cite
can say a lot about your 21st Century political views. And so the mapping showed that
the division between the opposition and conservatives is not just a division between the
people and a government, but one that ran right down the center of Iranian society.
Since 2008 we have kept an eye on the Iranian blogosphere, remapping it annually and
sometimes around special occasions like the 2009 election. There have been some
important changes, but also important continuity. The changes have resulted mainly
from the efforts of the regime and its allies to influence online communications in
their own favor, by suppressing dissenting voices and promoting friendly ones. The
suppression has taken the form of blocking and forced removal of blogs, as well as
intimidation of critical voices. The second approach has included efforts to flood the
network with Basijis and other pro-regime bloggers. Both of these efforts have met
with only partial success. The pro-regime, particularly CyberShia, sector of the network
has expanded, but it seems mainly to be talking to itself. The opposition component has
been diminished, but is still present and active. To stay online, most of the opposition
bloggers have dropped off the Iranian blog hosts and moved to international ones like
Blogspot and WordPress. This is where the continuity story picks up.
Even though some key regions of Iran’s weblog network grew and others shrank,
overall the structure has remained remarkably similar. On one side of a broad divide
lies opposition politics, literature, poetry, and cultural clusters associated with a mix
of ancient Persian and modern secular traditions. On the other side lies conservative
1
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politics and many strands of religious culture, theology and practice. Beyond these main
groupings are blogs on pop culture, sports, and parenting, similar to the US. Amazingly,
four years after our first map, only 15 percent of the blog URLs in the network were the
same but the structural form was recognizably intact. Like the human body, individual
cells grow and die but the person stays the same.
Lately, we have been mapping other “layers” of Iran’s networked public sphere. Because
of blocking and other restrictions, the growth of Twitter and Facebook has been slow
in Iran. But we have begun to identify significant Persian networks growing in each
platform. This work is just beginning but so far, these networks show a similar divide
between the religious and non-religious, pro-regime and regime critics. Of several
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries we have studied, Iran was the first where
we saw the regime mount a serious effort to shape the online environment by engaging
in it, not just blocking or filtering. Perhaps China began this first, and now it is common
practice in Syria, Russia and elsewhere, but Iran was definitely ahead of the curve. Now
that there has been a political shift in Iran, and some hints that Internet restrictions may
ease, it will be interesting to see how Iran’s networked public sphere evolves further. If
we see a reprise of the original storyline about democratic shoots, it would be nice to
discover that this time Spring is actually on the way.
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Summary of Key Findings
between 2002 and 2010, the persian blogosphere—or what is referred to as
“blogestan”—exploded in size and became the topic of numerous reports, essays,
videos and books. Global interest in this emerging trend, however, seemed to
decrease during the second presidential mandate of mahmoud ahmadinejad (20092013), when online social networking and microblogging became the most discussed
and researched it-related topics, along with the iranian regime’s policies aimed at
deterring online expression.

this report is aimed at addressing whether blogestan itself has faded in size,
activity and influence since 2009. to address these questions, we use three
parallel methodologies:
an audience survey of 165 persian blog users from inside and outside of iran;
a web crawling analysis of the iranian blogosphere, based on a list of 24,205
of the most active and connected persian blogs between 2008 and 2012;
a series of interviews with 20 influential bloggers living inside and outside iran.

the audience survey, the web crawling analysis, and the blogger interviews were
conducted between July and september 2013.

our research confirms that the persian blogosphere has undergone significant
shifts since the late 2000s as a result of a confluence of multiple factors: state
intervention, the rise of social networking sites, changes to iran’s socio-political
culture, and personal/professional issues. Our study finds that these factors have
indeed resulted in a general dilution of Blogestan, as indicated by declines in blogging
activities and the number of active blogs in our sample. Changes to the internal
dynamics of the Persian blogosphere are also evidenced by shifts in blog content, how
audiences interact with blogs and bloggers, and blogger-to-blogger relationships.
Specifically, this study finds a decline in overall blogging activity among our survey
respondents, with nearly half reporting having stopped their activity, in large part
because of time spent on social media. Our web crawling analysis confirmed this
high rate of blog abandonment, with only around 20 percent of the prominent blogs
from 2008-2009 still online in September 2013. In addition, our data shows a general
decrease in the frequency of posting: 70 percent of bloggers surveyed publish one
post per month or less—in contrast to earlier years when “if you did not blog for three
consecutive days, then you would get hundreds of messages asking if you are alright.”1
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Our analyses indicate that state intervention has played a central role in reshaping
and diffusing Blogestan. In particular, Internet filtering—which began around
2004-2005 and intensified in the post-2009 context—has significantly limited and
modified the diversity of voices in the Persian blogosphere, as well as the activity
and longevity of certain blogs. According to our data, filtering practices vary according
to a blog’s political orientation, web-hosting platform, and political climate. Reformist
blogs are 17 times more likely to be filtered or removed than conservative blogs.
Furthermore, three times the number of reformist blogs in our sample are “deleted” or
“not found” in comparison to conservative blogs. In addition, nearly all blogs hosted on
the only two popular platforms operating outside Iran, WordPress and Blogspot, are
blocked in Iran. According to our analysis, these platforms host a majority of reformist
blogs.
The state’s crackdown on online communications and bloggers produced a myriad
of changes to the Persian blogosphere, according to our analyses. In the early years,
external constraints encouraged the explosion of the blogosphere, as Blogestan
provided a less restrictive environment compared to mainstream media and political
discourse. Growing state pressures on bloggers, and the expansion of legal restrictions
on blogging activities and online communications, however, put both bloggers and the
Persian web in general under intense scrutiny. These conditions drove many prominent
bloggers to alter or cease their blogging activities, while others decided to move to
anonymous blogs, or to emigrate. Bloggers interviewed for this report confirm the
negative impact of the so-called “diaspora effect,” which triggered inherent changes in
the tone of their blogs and attitude both towards Iran and the West, often resulting in a
loss of audience and a decrease or even cessation of their blogging activities.
The growth of social media, and, in particular, social networking sites (SNSs) like
Facebook, is also among the most important causes of the erosion of Blogestan.
Our audience survey shows that although social networking sites are perceived as both
catalyst and impediment for blog usage, these platforms have significantly altered the
way readers interact with blogs. Direct access to the blogs seems to be progressively
replaced by an access via SNSs; the discussion on posts now takes place on SNSs and no
longer via blog comments. Although most readers report a change in how they access
and interact with blogs, nearly all respondents report still reading blogs, and according
to our analysis, there is no detectable pattern of decline in blog consumption. However,
the majority of the survey respondents started to read blogs at least four years ago: one
may ask if there is any replenishment of the blog reader base or if Blogestan relies on a
legacy readership.

4

Bloggers we interviewed generally agree that the increase in SNSs and link-sharing
sites have had a negative impact on Blogestan, as these platforms offer both users
and bloggers faster and more efficient modes of activity and participation. SNSs
facilitate publication and instant promotion of any content, including short, often less
analytical, and re-used content. They also provide a consistent, seamless and crossplatform
experience for readers. The rise in SNS usage has not only significantly
affected how and what types of blog content is produced and promoted, but also
has fundamentally altered the nature of blogger-to-blogger and blogger-to-audience
relationships within the Persian blogosphere. For instance, although the popular social
networking and link-sharing site Balatarin is widely used to promote blog posts and
to assess their impact, bloggers complain that it has also caused a “Balatarinization
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of Blogestan,” which favors provocative, radical, and extreme content over the more
thoughtful intellectual conversations that attracted many readers to early Blogestan.
Over time, most bloggers migrated to social networking sites to promote their blogs
and instantly reach their audiences. Although this parallel use of SNSs and blogs
helped some bloggers be efficient and responsive, most agree that the consequence of
this platform migration is that social media are becoming the de facto owners of blog
content, of discussion on posts, and by extension, of blogger-to-blogger and bloggerto-audience interactions. additionally the flood of content produced by thousands
of snss users meant bloggers’ unique social status was impacted, and their
contributions more easily lost in a sea of other contributions.
At the same time, bloggers we interviewed report that the closure of popular services
such as BlogRolling in 2010 and Google Reader in 2013 disrupted important connections
between bloggers, hindering a key dimension of the dynamics of Blogestan. For
instance, the feed aggregator Google Reader—nicknamed “Gooder” by Persian users—
allowed audiences to follow numerous blogs efficiently while circumventing the
censorship of filtered blogs.
Initially an unrestricted platform for a range of voices—including journalists and social
activists—Blogestan grew increasingly more politicized as a result of changes to Iran’s
socio-political culture and the increase in reformist and pro-democratic discourse.
These socio-political changes in Iranian society led many bloggers to abandon the
initial “personal diary” approach in favor of socio-political analysis and op-ed style
commentary. This trend, emphasized by many of our interviewed bloggers, is also
highlighted by our audience survey: the portion of blog readers interested in “personal
interests and hobbies” has dramatically decreased, while more and more readers want
to read about news, leading many bloggers to address more political topics that possibly
were not their first preferences, and, in turn, reducing their incentive to blog.
Beyond these factors, bloggers we interviewed also cite financial and professional
reasons for a decline in their own blogging activities. For instance, bloggers report
that they reduced their blogging activities when they left university and began their
professional lives, because blogging could not offer financial stability and because
blogging might cause some risks to their new careers.

5

Introduction
during the first decade of 2000, a significant number of reports, essays, videos,
and books depicted and analyzed one of the most exciting trends of the so-called
Web 2.0: the persian language blogosphere, or blogestan (literally: “province of the
blogs”). From 2002 onward, internet users from around the world were empowered
with user-friendly and affordable tools allowing them to be creators and not
just consumers of online information. With tens of thousands of active persian
blogs—and with persian reportedly being the third most-popular language on the
internet 2—blogestan was seen by many as one of the most promising internet
grassroots movements.
this report attempts to understand the state of blogestan in 2013 and how it has
evolved since Western expectations for the persian blogosphere began to deflate
in the late 2000s. in so doing, it is necessary to first review the main narratives on
blogestan in order to demonstrate how perceptions of the persian blogosphere have
developed over the past decade.

iranian blogosphere and the emancipatory
narrative
The first significant publication about Persian blogs, We are Iran: The Persian Blogs,
presented blogs as a safe haven for young, urban bloggers who espoused secular, prohuman rights, and democratic ideals, with aspirations for more freedom of thought
and speech, and an inclination for a modern, even “Western” way of life.3 This rich but
distorted picture both reflected and corroborated Western narratives about the Persian
blogosphere, 4 in which blogs were seen as the best hope for freedom and democracy
in Iran: “If the commentaries by young Iranian bloggers are anything to go by, it seems
that ideals have replaced ideology. They want accountability, pluralism and democracy
and have shed the dogmatic ideologies of the past.”5
Various studies reinforced this perception of Iranian bloggers. Babak Rahimi highlighted
the key role of the “20,000 active internet sites and weblogs [as] an alternative medium
for expression that is denied to [young Iranian and especially women] in real public.”6
Vancouver-based researcher Jordan Halevi (an online alias) asserted that most readers

2 This

6

ranking is often
quoted and is based
on December 2003
figures from the NITLE
Blog Census website:
http://web.archive.org/
web/20031202022722/
http://www.blogcensus.
net/?page=lang. In late
2006 Technocrati only

ranked Persian as the 10th
most used language on
blogs: http://www.sifry.com/
alerts/archives/000443.
html.
3

Nasrin Alavi, We are Iran:
The Persian Blogs (Brooklyn
NY: Soft Skull Press, 2005).
4 This perspective had
already been presented

by several Western
media outlets. See Alfred
Hermida, “Web Gives a
Voice to Iranian Women,”
BBC News, 17 June 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/sci/tech/2044802.stm;
and Michelle Delio, “Blogs
Opening Iranian Society?”
Wired, 28 May 2003,

http://www.wired.com/
culture/lifestyle/news/2003/
05/58976?currentPage=all.
5
6

Alavi, 318.

Babak Rahimi,
“Cyberdissent: The Internet
in Revolutionary Iran,”
Middle East Review of
International Affairs, 7.3
(2003), 4.
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of Persian-language blogs at the time were young urban university students who openly
opposed the regime’s policy of web censorship, while noting that these readers also held
“a wide array of views on religion.”7
In 2008, a short animated film, “A Nation of Bloggers,” described the blog movement
in Iran as “a revolution within the revolution,” and emphasized the reformist political
message many young Iranians voiced through their blogs. 8 This idealistic vision became
entrenched among Western policy makers, scholars and journalists—particularly
as international relations intensified during Ahmadinejad’s first presidential term
(2005-2009).
Australian journalist Antony Loewenstein described how the socio-political culture in
Iran forced citizens to develop public personalities distinct from their private lives, and
how blogs give Iranians space to more freely express their private personalities.9 While
acknowledging the diversity of Blogestan—mentioning the religious leaders trained
in Qom or pro-Ahmadinejad bloggers—Loewenstein portrayed Iranian bloggers as
primarily young, educated, urban, middle or upper class, and unwilling to follow the
society’s strict rules: “Iran’s online community is providing the strongest indication yet
of how a predominantly young population under thirty wants to articulate an alternative
Iranian identity.”10

blogestan’s complexity: a shift in narrative
Meanwhile, more meticulous observers were presenting a less monolithic image of
Blogestan, which reflected a much wider and dynamic socio-political spectrum than
mainstream depictions. Fred Petrossian analyzed a cluster of pro-Islamic Republic
Hezbollah blogs that focused not only on political issues but also on poetry, religion and
other topics.11 He also studied several anti-Semitic blogs, showing that anti-Semitism
is a dynamic movement in Iran, combining traditional/religious, and domestic/Western
elements.12
Additional studies attempted to analyze and quantify Blogestan in more systematic
ways. Tehran-based Iran Civil Society Organization Training and Research Center
(ICTRC) found a significant presence of blogs focused on religion, poetry and literature. 13
In 2008, blogger Arash Kamangir (author Arash Abadpour’s online alias) launched
“Didish” (“Have you seen it?”), a weekly analysis of trends and topics being discussed in

7

Fred Petrossian,
“Interview with Jordan
Halevi, a Canadian
Researcher on Iranian
Blogs,” Global Voices, 7
November 2006,
http://globalvoicesonline.
org/2006/11/07/interviewwith-jordan-haleviacanadian-researcher-oniranian-blogs/.

8

7

Vancouver Film School
(VFS), “IRAN: A Nation of
Bloggers,” 2008, http://
vimeo.com/2139754.

9

Antony Loewenstein,
The Blogging Revolution
(Melbourne: Melbourne
University Publishing,
2009).

10
11

Loewenstein, 56.

Fred Petrossian,
“Hezbollah Goes
Blogging,” Global Voices,
12 December 2005,
http://globalvoicesonline.
org/2005/12/12/iranianhezbollah-goes-blogging/.

12 Fred Petrossian, (under
the pen name Hamid
Tehrani), “Iranian antiSemitic Bloggers: From
Mickey Mouse’s Plot to
Gaddafi’s Jewishness,”
History News Network
(HNN), George Mason
University, 2008, http://
www.hnn.us/article/50535#.
13 Iran Civil Society
Organization Training and
Research Center (ICTRC),
“Persian Blogosphere
Crawler Report,” 2006.

This report found some
150,000 Persian blogs
and a domination of five
weblog farms (Blogfa,
Persianblog, Mihanblog,
BlogSky, Parsiblog and
Blogspot). It also showed
that although the overall
filtering ratio was very low
(around 1 percent), filtering
increased according to the
popularity of blogs and
differed according to the
blog-hosting platforms.
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the Persian blogosphere.14 Although Didish was not regularly maintained, the original
data were based on social aggregators that showed how blogs were competing against
other sources of news and information (such as Radio Zamaneh or BBC Persian).
The mainstream narrative was most successfully challenged by the hallmark study
“Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere,”15 which
used computational social network mapping in combination with human and automated
content analysis to demonstrate that the approximately 60,000 routinely updated
Persian blogs covered “a wide range of opinions representing religious conservative
points of view as well as secular and reform-minded ones, and topics ranging from
politics and human rights to poetry, religion, and pop culture.”16 Apart from depicting
the complex connections between the different network formations, or clusters
(“secular/reformist,” “conservative/religious,” “Persian poetry and literature,” and “mixed
networks”), the study also showed that a surprisingly small portion of reformist bloggers
actually blogged anonymously, and that less than 17 percent of the oppositional blogs
(“secular/reformist” cluster) were blocked inside Iran. 17
Blogistan: The Internet and Politics of Iran18 also recognized the complexity and diversity
of the Iranian blogosphere, noting that “far from being an undifferentiated ‘mass,’
bloggers and their ‘politics’ assume a range of broad orientations with different aims,
content, forms of expression and connections to various networks, many of them
contradictory and even hostile to one another.”19 Likewise, journalist Cyrus Farivar
asserted that “what has been happening in Iran during the two decades since the
Internet first arrived is far more interesting than the simple narrative of a young wired
generation throwing off the yoke of an oppressive regime.”20
Furthermore, Evgeny Morozov claimed that far from being the powerful tools for
democratic debate, the Internet in general—and blogs and social media in particular—
have been utilized by authoritarian powers for anti-democratic purposes, such as
for gathering intelligence on citizens. 21 In the case of Iran, Morozov warned against
equating “blogging to samizdat and bloggers with dissidents” as “there are plenty of
pro-government blogs in Iran,”22 some with even more conservative views than those
of the authorities themselves. 23

14 Arash Kamangir,
“Statistics of the Persian
Blogosphere, Project
‘Didish,’” 2008.
15

John Kelly and Bruce
Etling, “Mapping Iran’s
Online Public: Politics and
Culture in the Persian
Blogosphere,” Havard
University: Berkman
Center for Internet
and Society, 2008,
http://cyber.law.harvard.
edu/publications/2008/
Mapping_Irans_Online_
Public.

8

16

Kelly and Etling, 2.

17

For information on the
blocking of opposition
blogs, Kelly and Etling
relied on data from the
OpenNet Initiative, which
analyzed blocking patterns
from a sample of 1,800
blogs.

18

Annabelle Sreberny and
Gholam Khiabany, Blogistan:
The Internet and Politics of
Iran (London: I.B. Tauris,
2010).

19

Sreberny and Khiabany,
39.

20

Cyrus Farivar, Internet
of Elsewhere: The Emergent
Effects of a Wired World
(New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press,
2011).

21 Evgeny Morozov, The
Net Delusion: The Dark
Side of Internet Freedom
(New York: Public Affairs,
2011). See also Arman
Nafisi’s analysis of 153
blogs, which concluded
that the notion that blogs
promote democratic
ideals and political reform
in Iran lacks sufficient

evidence, “Blogging outside
Iran: A Tool for Internal
Democratic Change?”
Honors Thesis, University
of Washington, 2008,
http://ccce.com.washington.
edu/projects/assets/Nafisi_
Blogging_Outside_Iran.pdf.
22
23

Morozov, 46.

A series of reports by
the Small Media Foundation
(2013) also focused on
conservative bloggers.
See Small Media’s “Iranian
conservative bloggers”
pieces at http://storify.com/
smallmedia/.
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blogestan and state influence
In the post-2009 context in particular, more researchers paid closer attention to the
negative impacts of state interference over the Internet, including the expansion of
technological and regulatory restrictions over online communications. 24 The OpenNet
Initiative’s (ONI) series of monitoring reports of the state’s filtering practices have
provided key documentation of the evolution of technological and policy-based
restrictions in terms of access to online media and blogs, and blog-hosting platforms
within Iran. 25 For instance, the program’s 2006-2007 report found that at the time
a substantial number of individual blogs hosted on Blogspot were filtered—including
blogs related to religion, women’s rights, political reform, and reproductive health—
while few blogs were filtered on Iranian platforms like Blogfa and Persianblog. 26
Likewise, Small Media Foundation also examined Iran’s more recent filtering policies
and found that authorities use a mix of “traditional” techniques (“black lists” of
domains, keywords in URL and IP addresses) with more advanced methods (deep packet
inspection, bandwidth throttling, alleged “smart control” of social networking sites, and
filtering of VPNs and other circumvention tools). 27 These practices have had a strong
impact on blogs and blog-hosting platforms on Blogfa and other Iran-based services,
according to the organization.
At the same time, human rights groups and media monitoring NGOs, including Reporters
Without Borders, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, Freedom House and
Article 19 have raised international attention around the upsurge in detentions and
imprisonment of journalists and bloggers, especially since 2009. 28 According to Freedom
House, “since June 2009, the authorities have cracked down on online activism through
various forms of judicial and extra-legal intimidation. An increasing number of bloggers
have been threatened, arrested, tortured, kept in solitary confinement, and denied
medical care, while others have been formally tried and convicted. At least 50 bloggers
and online activists were arrested in 2009 and 2010.”29

24

9

“Internet Censorship
in Iran: An Infographic,”
Iran Media Program
(IMP), Center for Global
Communication Studies,
Annenberg School for
Communication, University
of Pennsylvania, http://
iranmediaresearch.org/en/
research/pdffile/1296.

2007,” 2007, https://
opennet.net/studies/
iran2007; “Internet
Filtering in Iran,” 16 June
2009, https://opennet.
net/research/profiles/iran;
“After the Green Movement:
Internet Controls in Iran,”
15 February 2013. www.
opennet.net/iranreport2013.

25 OpenNet Initiative’s
reports on Iranian filtering
and Internet censorship
policies include: “Internet
Filtering in Iran in 2006-

26
27

OpenNet Initiative, 2007.

Small Media Foundation,
“Iranian Internet
Infrastructure and Policy
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Introduction

blogestan and social networking sites
Another recent focus of scholarship relates to the impacts of new technologies on
the Persian blogophere. As highlighted by Sreberny and Khiabany: “[...] rather than
targeting a large audience, [blogs] are indeed written for the benefit of other bloggers
and ‘communities of interests’.”30 If, as these authors suggest, blogging has always
been more a conversation than a traditional medium like broadcasting, this would
partly explain why many bloggers brought their “conversations” to social networking
sites, where the audience is structurally limited to one’s own network (“friends,” “fans,”
“followers,” etc.).
Social networking and microblogging sites have also contributed to the decline of blogs
as a space for political debate, according to some researchers. Using a short survey of
Iranian bloggers and media professionals from across the political spectrum, Petrossian
confirmed the growing influence of Facebook as a central platform for obtaining and
discussing information. Still, survey respondents said that blogs are irreplaceable,
particularly for political and civil society activities.31
In a 2013 study defining archetypes of Iranian Internet users, Arash Abadpour and
Collin Anderson concluded that blogging still plays a significant role for a portion of
Internet users.32 Likewise, researcher Klara Debeljak’s 2013 survey of more than 1,000
respondents in Iran showed that 36 percent of respondents use the Internet and
14 percent use blogs as sources for news and information.33 This corroborates Iran
Media Program’s earlier survey on media consumption habits among Iranians, in which
26 percent of the general population and nearly 90 percent of younger, tech savvy
respondents reported turning to the Internet first to access news and information.34
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41.

31 Fred Petrossian, “Iran:
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Global Voices, 14 April 2010,
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Introduction

the recurrent Question of the size of blogestan

number of persian blogs
over the years, according
to various sources

Many observers have attempted to define Blogestan and its evolution by simply
measuring its size—an appealing approach because of its simplicity and objectivity. Yet
quantifying the Persian blogosphere has proven less straightforward than anticipated
and has produced inconsistent results, as such measurements first require determining
the content and boundaries of Blogestan. For instance, limiting the analysis to Persianlanguage blogs excludes other languages Iranians use for blogging (English, French,
Urdu, Arabic, Turkic-Azeri, Kurdish), and includes bloggers using Persian language who
are not from Iran or part of the Iranian diaspora (such as Afghani, Azerbaijani, and Tajik).

13,000 blogs
(BBC Persian, 2003)
52,000 blogs
(NITLE Blog Census, 2003)36
85,000 blogs
(Alavi, 2005)
400,000 blogs
(ONI, 2007)
700,000 blogs,
including 100,000 active
(“A Nation of Bloggers,” 2008)
200,000 blogs, including
60,000 routinely updated
(Kelly & Etling, 2008)
70,000 active blogs
(Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010)
60,000 to 100,000
(Farivar, 2011)

Likewise, limiting the data to the “.ir” top-level domain is also not useful, as “.ir” domains
are not always used for blogs, particularly because of state-imposed restrictions. Many
bloggers use Persian-dedicated blog farms like Blogfa, Persianblog, and Parsiblog.
Moreover, there is no real consensus on the definition of a blog: Is a blog single
authored? Must it follow a simple layout and be organized in reverse-chronological
order? Does it need to include a blogroll, an archive of posts, or an RSS feed? Does it
need to allow user comments? Lastly, as noted by Bruce Arnold from Caslon Analytics,
“several studies indicate that 60 percent to 80 percent of blogs are abandoned soon
after their creation.”35 The question of whether a blog can be considered active is
therefore key to obtaining an accurate count of the number of blogs. Again there is little
consensus on what can be considered an “active” blog.
Due to the vague definitions of “Blogestan,” “blog,” “active blog,” as well as the difficulty
in turning these definitions into algorithms for large data collection, the results of the
numerous attempts to measure the size of Blogestan have varied widely. Although
researchers have used other methodologies to conceptualize, demarcate and analyze
“national webs” and their features, 37 these new standardized methods have not been
used regularly and systematically enough over time to offer a sufficient relevant
benchmark to study the evolution of the Persian blogosphere.

35 Caslon Analytics
Blogging, “Blog Statistics
and Demographics,”
February 2009,
http://www.caslon.com.au/
weblogprofile1.htm.
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The National Institute
for Technology in Liberal
Education (NITLE) Blog
Census, (no longer
functional, information can
be accessed at:

http://web.archive.org/
web/20031202022722/
http://www.blogcensus.
net/?page=lang.)

37 Richard Rogers, et al.
“National Web Studies:
Mapping Iran Online,” Iran
Media Program/Digital
Methods Initiative, 2012,
https://mappingiranonline.
digitalmethods.net/.

Methodology and Sample Information
this report presents the results of a comparison of three qualitative and
quantitative sets of data in order to achieve a more comprehensive analysis
of the development and status of the persian blogosphere.38
Our analysis is derived from:
• A majority of respondents in
our audience survey sample are
younger than 30 years of age.
• Roughly two-thirds
(66 percent) are male and
the remainder are female.
• Most are educated, holding
at least a bachelor’s degree.

An audience survey of 165 blog readers, focusing on blog consumption habits and
how these have developed over time. The 27-question survey was created on Google
Forms and distributed to a network of bloggers via email, Facebook, Twitter, Google+.
As further detailed in the Methodology of the Audience Survey (see Annex p.40), we
cannot assess to what extent this sample is representative of the readers of Persian
blogs. However, our sample includes a range of respondents in terms of gender, age,
educational background, and residence (from both inside and outside Iran).

• Approximately two thirds
(63 percent) of respondents
live inside Iran.

• Our web crawling dataset
consists of 24,205 blogs.
• The sample is dominated by
Blogfa, which represents nearly
70 percent of the total
24,205 blogs.
• Because of the methodology
used to select these active and
prominent blogs, the size of
sample differs by and ranges
between 6,061 blogs to 9,121.

• Eleven respondents lived
in Iran and nine had left the
country since they started
blogging.

A web crawling analysis: To complement the quantitative data of the audience survey,
we used automated web crawling techniques to assess the connection between factors
such as filtering, political orientation, and hosting platform on the evolution of Persian
blogs over time. Our crawling analysis was based on the data from the 2008 “Mapping
Iran’s Online Public” and on the annual updates of this dataset aggregated by data
analysis company, Morningside Analytics through 2012. We also ran an extra data
collection and analysis in order to gather information on the status and levels of activity
of each blog, as well as on filtering and/or removal occurrences. Every blog from each
annual sample was attached to a topical category (or “attentive cluster”)—“reformist,”
“conservative, or “other”39 —using human examination and a computational analysis of
the frequencies of words and phrases.
A series of interviews with 20 bloggers who have been active members of Blogestan
sometime during the past ten year period. 40 Bloggers were selected on the basis of their
personal experience with blogging as well as their knowledge of Blogestan in general.

• Eleven of the interviewed
bloggers were female
and nine were male.
• Seventeen were currently
bloggers and three had stopped
blogging for different reasons.

38 For more detail about
the methodology of all
three data sets, see Annex.
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39

The “other” cluster
includes Persian poetry
and literature, and mixed
networks.

40

Interviews were
conducted between June
20 and September 12, 2013
over email, Skype,

or Google Chat,
depending on the bloggers’
preferences and security
requirements.

Key Findings from the Audience
Survey
this study finds that the persian blogosphere has experienced significant shifts
and patterns of decline since the late 2000s as a result of a combination of: state
influence—specifically increased filtering and direct pressure on bloggers; the rise of
social networking sites; changes to socio-political conditions in iran; and personal/
professional reasons.
results from each of the three datasets used in this study are presented below.

a Legacy readership
nine out of ten of respondents began reading blogs at least four years ago. While
this may indicate that blogestan’s readership has a strong pre-2009 legacy, the
question remains as to whether the new generation continues to read blogs or if they
skip directly to other social media like Facebook, Balatarin, Twitter etc.

FiGure 1. FirST eNCOuNTer WiTH BLOGS

ABOUT 2 YEARS AGO
ABOUT 3 YEARS AGO
6.3%
ABOUT 4 YEARS AGO

5.7%
ABOUT 1 YEAR AGO
2.5%

6.3%
ABOUT 5 YEARS AGO
8.2%
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still reading blogs
nearly all respondents (99 percent) report they still read blogs and a solid majority
do so several times a week or more.

FiGure 2. FrequeNCy OF reAdiNG BLOGS

NO REPLY

SEVERAL TIMES A DAY

3%

22.4%

LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH
1.8%
ABOUT ONCE A MONTH
3.6%
ABOUT EVERY TWO WEEKS
1.2%
ABOUT ONCE A WEEK

EVERY DAY

10.9%

34.5%

SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK
BUT NOT EVERY DAY
22.4%

evolution of reading habits: no clear
Quantitative pattern
The vast majority of respondents (92 percent) report a change in their blog reading
habits between the time they started to read blogs and the summer of 2013. However,
there is no quantitative trend in terms of modification of time spent on blogs, number
of blogs followed, or frequency of visits. This suggests that the change in reading habits
is qualitative rather than quantitative.

FiGure 3. CHANGeS iN BLOG reAdiNG HABiTS

TIME SPENT ON BLOGS
DECREASE

17.0%
71.5%

NO CHANGE
INCREASE

11.5%
NUMBER OF BLOGS READ
19.4%
49.7%
30.9%
FREQUENCY OF VISITING BLOGS
18.8%
62.4%
18.8%
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social media both catalyst and impediment
to blog consumption
respondents overwhelmingly chose social media as the primary reason for both
an increase and decrease in their blog reading activities. Additional reasons cited by
respondents for a decline in blog use are a decrease in blog activity, decreased interest
in blog posts, decline in the general number of blogs, filtering, and personal reasons,
respectively. After social media, the top reason respondents cite for increased blog
reading is longer time spent online.

FiGure 4. reASONS FOr CHANGe iN BLOG reAdiNG HABiTS

MORE TIME SPENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA
REASONS
FOR DECREASING
BLOG READING
REASONS
FOR INCREASING
BLOG READING

30.9%

28.5%
ACTIVITY OF BLOGS
26.1%

8.5%
INTEREST OF POSTS
18.2%

11.5%
TIME SPENT ONLINE
7.9%

21.8%
PERSONAL REASONS

10.3%

4.2%
FILTERING OF BLOGS

12.7%
LESS BLOGS
10.3%
BLOGS ARE NOT POLITICIZED ENOUGH
1.2%
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evolution of readers’ preferences
Survey participants cite decreasing interest in personal topics (everyday life, interests
and hobbies, other people’s opinion and experience) as well as in topics with social and
cultural themes. In contrast, respondents report increased interest in news consumption
(domestic news, foreign affairs, economics), as well as for information that could
improve their situation in difficult economic times (education, life abroad, IT/science).

FiGure 5. reASONS TO reAd BLOGS, iNiTiALLy ANd NOW

INTEREST / HOBBY
56.4%

INITIALLY
43.0%

IN 2013
PEOPLE'S OPINION

55.8%
45.5%
EDUCATION
26.1%
38.8%
LEARNING FROM PEOPLE'S EXPERIENCES
40.0%
35.2%
NEWS
29.7%
38.8%
PEOPLE'S DAILY LIVES
27.3%
30.3%
TRAVEL / LIFE ABROAD
15.8%
24.2%
OTHER
10.3%
6.1%
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FiGure 6. TOPiCS mOST OFTeN reAd ON BLOGS

SOCIAL

RELIGION
70.3%

INITIALLY

33.9%

60.0%

IN 2013
EVERYDAY LIFE

32.7%
ENVIRONMENT

69.1%

30.9%

50.3%

24.2%

CULTURAL

ECONOMY
68.5%

29.1%

55.8%

38.2%

IRAN NEWS

COMMUNITY ISSUES
62.4%

22.4%

68.5%
SCIENCE / TECH / IT

22.4%
SPORTS

46.7%

20.6%

52.7%
WOMEN'S RIGHTS

26.7%
JOKES, FUN

43.0%

20.0%

38.8%

12.1%
HEALTH

LIFESTYLE
35.2%

12.1%

35.8%
SCHOOL OR PROFESSIONAL ISSUES
35.2%
28.5%

OTHER
3.6%
2.4%

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LITERATURE
34.5%
44.2%
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Access via Social Networks Progressively
Replacing Direct Access to Blogs
Respondents conﬁrm the growing prominence of social networking and link-sharing
sites as a means of accessing blogs: a majority report they no longer access blogs
directly but instead do so through various social media and link-sharing platforms.

FIGURE 7. USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING AND LIN

HARING SITES TO ACCESS BLOGS

DIRECTLY TO BLOGS
68.2%

INITIALLY
41.8%

IN 2013
SOCIAL NETWORKING
30.6%

47.3%
LINK SHARING
14.5%
16.4%
RSS
51.5%
58.5%

Comments on Social Networks More Frequent
than on Blogs
although they still post comments on individual blogs.

FIGURE 8. FREQUENCY OF COMMENTING ON BLOGS BY PLATFO

AROUND ONCE A MONTH
FACEBOOK
GOOGLE+

3 TO 5 TIMES A WEEK

3.0%

14.5%

4.2%

7.9%
9.7%

BLOGS

AROUND TWICE A MONTH

5.5%
ONCE A DAY

6.7%

9.1%

3.6%

5.5%
6.7%

1.8%

AROUND ONCE A WEEK

MORE THAN ONCE A DAY

10.3%
2.4%
4.8%
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most blog readers are also bloggers
but many have stopped their blogging activity
Our data corroborates prior research indicating that there is a significant overlap
between readers of blogs and active bloggers. 41 A strong majority of respondents in our
sample currently write or have written a blog in addition to being an active blog reader.
Yet according to our data, more than a third of these respondents have stopped their
blogging activity.

FiGure 9. BLOGGiNG ACTiviTy AmONG reAderS

NEVER BLOGGED
17.9%

STILL BLOGGING
45.1%

STOPPED BLOGGING
37.0%

a slow publication pace
Among our subset of readers who are also bloggers, the rate of publication on active
blogs is relatively low. Nearly 60 percent publish a post only once a month, or even less
frequently.
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Sreberny and Khiabany, 41.
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Reasons to Start Blogging / Reasons to Stop
Blogging
Interestingly, there is signiﬁcant overlap among our subset of readers who are also
bloggers in terms of the reasons they cite for both starting and stopping blogging
activities. According to our data, “personal satisfaction”/“personal reasons” are the main
reasons survey respondents give for beginning as well as abandoning a blog. “Saying
things that cannot be said in public” and “sharing news not covered by mass media,”
are cited as important reasons for starting a blog, while “fear of censorship” and “too
many blogs ﬁltered,” are the key reasons for no longer blogging. One crucial reason for
stopping blogging is the increase in time spent on other social media platforms.

FIGURE 10. REASONS FOR STARTING A BLOG

FIGURE 11. REASONS FOR STOPPING
BLOGGING

PERSONAL SATISFACTION

PERSONAL REASONS
52.7%

SAYING THINGS THAT CAN'T BE SAID IN PUBLIC

27.3%
TOO MUCH TIME ON SOCIAL MEDIA

35.2%
TALKING ABOUT DAILY LIFE

21.8%
FEAR OF CENSORSHIP

32.7%
SHARING NEWS NOT COVERED BY MASS MEDIA

LESS TIME ONLINE

24.2%

5.5%

RAISING AWARENESS ON A PARTICULAR TOPIC
21.2%
WAY TO FILL TIME / HOBBY
10.9%
BECOMING A PUBLIC FIGURE
9.1%
OTHERS
3%
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a divergence in blog content and reader
preference
Our data show that blog topics recently addressed by our subset of blog readers who
also blog focus mainly on personal concerns (daily life, lifestyle) and socio-cultural
issues—topics in which the readers in our sample also report having less interest.
Conversely, topics that readers cite having been more interested in over the years
(domestic news, foreign affairs, science/IT, economics) are for the most part not often
covered by our subset of bloggers. This suggests a divergence between readers’ current
interests and the topics that are actually addressed by bloggers.

FiGure 12. reCeNT BLOG TOPiCS

SCHOOL OR PROFESSIONAL ISSUES

DAILY LIFE

6.1%

23.6%
RELIGION

SOCIAL

5.5%

21.2%
ECONOMY

CULTURE

4.8%

18.8%

JOKES, FUN

IRAN NEWS

4.2%

18.2%
SPORTS

LIFESTYLE
10.3%

OTHERS

WOMEN'S RIGHTS
9.1%
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
8.5%

1.8%
ENVIRONMENT
1.2%

SCIENCE / TECH / IT

HEALTH

6.7%

0.6%

COMMUNITY ISSUES
6.1%
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Key Findings of Web Crawling
Analysis
As noted in the previous methodology section, our crawling analysis is based on
datasets of 24,205 blogs from the 2008 Persian Blogosphere project,42 and on
annual updates of this dataset aggregated by Morningside Analytics through 2012.
We also conducted additional analyses on the status and level of activity of each
blog, as well as any filtering or removal occurrences, according to assigned clusters
of the blog’s political orientation (“reformist,” “conservative,” or “other”).43
According to our findings:
There are notable differences in the frequency of filtering and removals between
different blog hosts and political affiliation clusters. The two platforms based outside
Iran—Blogspot (often called “Blogger” after being purchased by Google in 2003) and
WordPress—appear to be almost entirely filtered in Iran (98 percent and 96 percent,
respectively). This not entirely complete level of filtering is due to the fact that although
the filtering system in Iran uniformly blocks Blogspot and WordPress, exceptions are
explicitly formulated in a so-called “white list” allowing access to specific sites.
A review of the 2 percent of Blogspot and 4 percent of WordPress blogs from our
dataset that are not blocked and were still active in September 2013 shows that none
include reformist content and half are explicitly pro-regime or contain hardline religious
content.44
Furthermore, our research shows that Blogspot and WordPress attract almost no
conservative blogs (1 percent and 4 percent respectively) and host a majority of
reformist blogs (51 percent and 78 percent respectively). In contrast, Parsiblog attracts
predominantly conservative (96 percent) and almost no reformist blogs (1 percent).
Lastly, removals due to violations of the law or terms-of-service agreements are rather
limited on platforms operated from inside Iran (4 percent or below) and never occur
on Blogspot and WordPress, which is understandable as platforms outside Iran are not
required to comply with Iranian laws and policies.45 Removals are enforced on Iranian
platforms regardless of the location of their servers.46

42

22

Kelly and Etling, 2008.

Each blog in the annual
samples was assigned
a topical category (or
attentive clusters) using
human examination and a
computational analysis of
the frequencies of words
and phrases. See more on
Web Crawling methodology
in Part on methodology and
sample information.

43

See, for example:
http://basijnetwork.
blogspot.com and http://
ahestan.WordPress.com/.

44

For more detailed data
on removals by Iranian and
non-Iranian platforms, see
Part 2 on methodology and
sample information.

45

46
Any entity—
persons, companies, or
infrastructure—that could
fall within the jurisdiction
of Iran can be defined as
an “Iranian platform.”
While most Persian
blogging platforms are
hosted outside of the
country, their owners are
either inside or beholden
to the government in some

way. Hence, WordPress
would not fall within this
domain; however, Blogfa
would. Even though Blogfa
is incorporated and hosted
outside Iran, its founder
lives in Iran.

Key Findings of Web
Crawling Analysis

the number of reformist blogs that are filtered or removed is 17 times greater than
that of conservative blogs. We also cross-referenced the information between
clusters and filtering/removal for violations of the law or terms-of-service agreements.
Our analyses shows that reformist blogs are more often filtered or removed than
conservative ones: nearly half of reformists blogs in our data set have been filtered or
removed, compared to just 2.8 percent of conservative blogs. We also observe that most
blogs that were taken down at some point are still technically filtered, which suggests
that they were first filtered by the authorities and subsequently removed.

FiGure 13. FiLTeriNG ANd remOvAL By CLuSTer AFFiLiATiON

0.59%
5.42%

ONLY REMOVED
FILTERED
AND REMOVED

40.89%

ONLY FILTERED

0.42%
2.23%
9.33%

0.45%
0.74%
1.58%
CONSERVATIVE BLOGS

REFORMIST BLOGS

OTHER CLUSTERS

three times the number of reformist blogs have been “deleted” or are “not found”
compared to conservative blogs. We analyzed the error messages generated by the
hosting platform and coded these errors as “deleted” (when the blog was deleted and it
is not specified if it was deleted by the platform or by the user) and “not found” (when
the blog could not be located by the platform, which implies it does not exist anymore).
The imbalance in the rate of these errors between reformist and conservative blogs
suggests that at least a portion of these reformist blogs which were either deleted or
not found have actually been taken down for political reasons and the hosting platform
is not transparent about the motive behind these removals.

FiGure 14. PerCeNTAGe OF BLOGS “deLeTed” Or “NOT FOuNd”
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conservative blogs tend to have a longer lifespan than reformist blogs. In crossreferencing information on the availability, activity, and political orientation of the blogs
from the different yearly samples, our data show that blogs supporting reformist ideas
have a shorter lifespan than conservative blogs. 47
If we consider the entire list of blogs, regardless of the year(s) they were present in
the annual samples, we find that 39 percent of conservative blogs versus 31 percent
of reformist blogs were still available and active in September 2013. In addition, 38
percent of blogs from the “other” cluster were still active in September 2013.

FiGure 15. PerCeNTAGe OF STiLL ACTive BLOGS CLuSTer AFFiLiATiON (AS OF 2013)
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by Morningside Analytics.
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Filtered blogs tend to have a shorter lifespan. Similarly, when we cross-reference
information on the availability and activity of the blogs from the different yearly
samples and the frequency of their filtering, the results indicate that filtered blogs have
a shorter lifespan than non-filtered blogs. 48
If we consider the entire list of blogs regardless of the year(s) they were present in the
yearly samples, we find that 45 percent of non-filtered blogs are still available and
active in September 2013, versus only 30 percent of filtered blogs.

FiGure 16. PerCeNTAGe OF STiLL ACTive FiLTered ANd NON-FiLTered BLOGS (AS OF 2013)
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We also conducted an analysis of the number of blogs that have been taken down by
blog platforms for violating the law or terms-of-service agreements. As our research
shows, most removals target blogs hosted on Blogfa, 49 which hosts the majority of
Persian blogs.50 We observe that of the 16,755 Blogfa blogs in our sample, 668—or
nearly 4 percent were removed.51 The majority of the removals took place between 2011
and 2013.
48

The trend is reversed in
the 2011 sample, with 44
percent of filtered and 42
percent of non-filtered still
active in 2013. This is an
effect of our sampling (see
previous note).
49
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The scripts we developed
to detect removal
messages were more
efficient on Blogfa than on
other Persian platforms.

Further investigation with
scripts refined for each
blog hosting platform could
produce supplementary
results.
50

As noted previously,
74% of blogs in our sample
are hosted on Blogfa.
See Part 2 on methodology
and sample information.
51

These numbers are
consistent with those

reflected by the site owner,
as reported by Small Media
Foundation: “Alireza Shirazi,
the founder of Blogfa,
expressed concerns on
Twitter about the future of
the domestic blogosphere
due to filtering: “Horrible
events are occurring.
I receive orders to block
around or more than
100 blogs per day. In the
future, [we won’t] have

any blogs.” Shirazi has
previously noted weeks
where Blogfa received up
to 600 takedown orders,
elaborating that they
are often for offending
terms related to hacking
and music.” See “Iranian
Internet Infrastructure and
Policy Report,” Small Media
Foundation, January 2013,
http://smallmedia.org.uk/
content/62.
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Moreover, the blogs removed between 2010 and 2013 had existed for at least four years
on average, based on their data from the Archive Wayback Machine website.52

FiGure 17. FrequeNCy OF BLOG remOvALS ON PerSiAN WeB HOSTS
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In looking closer at the years 2011 to 2013, it appears that blog removals occur
irregularly. For instance, we can observe a peak in takedowns during the first quarter of
2013, when authorities were engaged in an intensive online censorship effort in the runup to the June 2013 presidential election.53
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Key Findings from Blogger Interviews
our interviews with bloggers focused on the following areas of inquiry:

the impact of emigration of many prominent bloggers on the persian blogosphere,
or the so-called “diaspora effect,” and whether and how this produced changes
in blog content, readership and relationships with audiences both inside
and outside iran;
how personal and/or professional issues—including financial and economic
pressures and career changes—could influence blogging activities;
the influence of state intervention, including both filtering practices and direct
pressure on bloggers by authorities;
the role of new technologies, particularly social networking sites and
micro-blogging, in reshaping the interactivity and dynamics of the iranian
blogosphere;
the impact of changes in the socio-political climate in iran during the first
decade of 2000 on the persian blogging culture.

the diaspora effect: the impact of relocation
Bloggers we interviewed stress the “diaspora effect,” or the impact of relocation from
Iran to other countries, as an important factor that modified the relationship between
bloggers and their audiences. At the start of a blogger’s career, a blogger establishes an
audience through a particular perspective, style, and language—the blogger’s “particular
flavor,” as one respondent puts it. Changes in a blogger’s tone and attitude after moving
from Iran to another country can impact how the blogger is perceived by readers, as
does the fact that the blogger is no longer in the same place and living in the same
conditions as a large part of their audience.
For instance, while a blogger in Iran is more to likely to provide first-hand experiences
of events, those located outside Iran more often rely on other sources of information,
which can have their own prejudices and biases, according to our interviews. One
blogger explains how after moving to Europe he noticed a change in his approach to
subjects that are forbidden or taboo in Iranian society, as well as “subtle, unconscious
changes that the audience detects and reacts to.”

“
27

You are not the same person that you were before you left Iran and the audience notices
this. You are like a product which has changed its flavor and thus needs to market itself
again and recreate its audience.”
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Our interviewees also emphasize how emigration produces a shift in perspectives, which
can result in declines in or changes to blogging activities. On a practical level, relocated
bloggers typically have less time to blog while integrating into a new environment,
for instance. Yet relocation can also mean a change in a blogger’s perception the host
country and the West in general, as well as a shift of perspective on Iran, especially with
respect to notions about freedom of expression and individual rights.
Some relocated bloggers may even change gears by supporting the decisions of the
ruling class in Iran (if they were previously against it), according to surveyed bloggers.
Nostalgia for the homeland and seeking potential opportunities to return to Iran may
may have persuaded bloggers to abandon previous perspectives on certain topics.
Audiences often detect a change in the blogger’s value system and priorities, which
has a significant impact on readers’ continuing interest in the blog. In these cases, the
blogger may be described as “having lost it” or “having turned her back to her own cause
now that she is safe.”

Personal and Professional Issues
Interviewed bloggers indicate that when they first interacted with the Internet in the
late 1990s or early 2000s, they mainly went online for specific purposes, such as to
email or visit a certain website. However, using the Internet as a platform for publishing
content was also among the very first applications mentioned by bloggers with whom
we spoke.
Blogging, except in rare cases, did not provide the necessary economic or financial security,
according to interviewed bloggers. In addition to the time required to maintain a
functional blog, some bloggers maintained self-hosted blogs which incurred additional
costs.

“

They closed the newspaper. I was still at school and had a small printing business.
I used that income to pay for the expenses of my blog.”
Statements from our interviews with bloggers show that in the early years of Blogestan,
many bloggers were university students. One reason for the proliferation of student
bloggers could be that universities and academic centers were among the first
institutions in Iran with affordable or even free access to the Internet. This also explains
why many bloggers had to reduce their blogging activities as they moved into later
stages of adulthood.

“
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We used to publish a local newspaper in the university that they had just banned and so
we had discussions on what we could do next. My brother used to bring printed hardcopies
of different websites and blogs home. One day he printed a copy of the instructions that
Hossein Derakhshan had written for setting up a blog in Persian. My brother encouraged
me to start a blog. So I did, and I started publishing what I would send out to the
newspaper on my blog as well. These pieces were related to the internal politics of the
university.”
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“

Bloggers also mention their involvement in more formal online publishing as an
important factor for retiring from Blogestan. One blogger describes his “ascent” from
a beginner to a well-known political blogger who was later recruited by online news
portals based outside Iran.

I had to manage two websites and I did not really have time for my own blog.
The point is that the websites had much greater audience size and capacity than my own
blog, so I gradually shifted all my efforts to the websites.”

state influence (i): blogestan a haven for Journalists and activists
Interviewed bloggers emphasize that state involvement played a key role in the initial
expansion of Blogestan. External pressures appear to have encouraged many bloggers
to start their own blog, as Blogestan provided a less-restrictive environment compared
to Iranian mainstream media, in terms of content and attitude towards the social/
political establishment.

“

In Blogestan, people talked about the topics in a more relaxed way than in print media
and in a language which was closer to audiences. The content was both less constrained
and more informal. Both aspects were rarities.”
Moreover, for bloggers who also worked for more formal publications like local
newspapers, the restrictions on print media also drove many to invest more time in
blogging. One blogger working at a local newspaper describes how he decided to “take
blogging more seriously [because] they were just telling us that we cannot write about
this or that topic in the newspaper.” Several interviewed bloggers describe blogging as
an act of resistance against the hegemony of mainstream media, corporate ownership
and state control of the media and public sphere.

“

Bloggers insist on producing a different point of view, when everything else is harmonized.”
This harmonization meant that the media was forced to comply with restrictive
conditions and the closure of a significant number of newspapers and magazines.
Blogestan was one of the few outlets for former journalists. Blogestan in particular and
the web in general, attracted increased interest from journalists—even though many
journalists, according to one blogger “did not take Blogestan seriously at the beginning.”
While Blogestan enabled anyone to produce and interact outside the restrictive
boundaries of the public space in Iran, certain groups converged on cyberspace faster
than others. For instance, the early years of Blogestan saw a surge of participation
among female bloggers sharing perspectives on both public and private matters. One
female blogger points out that women were essentially only represented as mothers and
wives in traditional media, while in Blogestan, women were less constrained and could
have an identity outside of these social constructs. As such, Blogestan provided a public
forum in which females could discuss their perspectives on a range of issues, including
ideas of sexuality and intimate relationships, according to our interviews.
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Social and political activists were also quick to start using blogs and many of the
interviewees mention that blogs made it possible to discuss social and political issues
not allowed in the print media. Direct involvement in activist causes soon became a
major theme in Blogestan. One blogger recalls how he used Javascript codes to produce
a timer showing the amount of time that pro-democracy journalist Akbar Ganji had
spent in prison: “I created the widget and then other bloggers posted it on their blogs.”

state influence (ii): crackdown on blogestan
and its aftermath
Many of our participants suggest that blogging was a way “to be heard” and that
they did not have a particular target audience in mind and or an understanding of the
consequences of their public content. One blogger notes that his complete openness
about his opinions meant that the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security agents
were reading his blog, something he only realized when confronted by government
officials.

“

They showed me a stack of papers, each one a blog post that I had written,
and they had highlighted portions and sections. After I was released, my blog in effect
became my case file. I did continue blogging. I would even address my interrogator
on the blog, and he once called me back to mention that I was making my case
more dangerous. All in all, the blog wasn’t what it used to be. It wasn’t a channel of
communication between me and my audience. Unwanted eyes now preyed on my blog
for what I wrote and for the others who commented on it. It was neither personal
for me, nor safe for the audience.”
Bloggers in our interview sample report instances in which their friends or family
expressed discomfort with the content they published, particularly if the blog post
contained references to sensitive personal or sexual issues. One describes an incident in
which her partner was extremely displeased about her latest post in which she discussed
an incident of sexual abuse that happened during her childhood. Another blogger
describes a post with a sexual undertone that caused tensions with her colleagues. Thus,
some bloggers interviewed report that they stopped publishing content that was outside
the normative framework of their social circles.
Our interviews indicate that as Iranian authorities began to monitor cyberspace in
order to trace and spot dissent, bloggers became more aware of issues of security and
privacy, which lead to changes in their blogging content and activities. One blogger
suggests that: “more eyes were watching.” Some bloggers in our sample report they
became more self-aware and rechanneled some conversations into more private online
or offline spaces. Increased awareness of privacy issues also can be traced to the fact
that as younger bloggers grew older they became more concerned about the potential
impact of their blogging activities on their professional careers. One blogger explains
that after he graduated from university and started his job, he reviewed his blog and
unpublished several pieces of content.
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Although several interviewed bloggers emphasize the importance of blogging under
their real names, the increase in state intervention and scrutiny forced many bloggers
to “hide behind a pseudonym,” as one blogger explains. Under these circumstances, it is
likely that some simply opted to stop blogging. Others chose to start a new anonymous
blog. These bloggers, however, were accustomed to receiving attention and feedback
from their audiences and their anonymous blog often failed to compete with the famous
blog and thus, we suggest, bloggers lost interest in working under the new alias. Around
the same time, social media was on the ascent, and bloggers began to channel more
sensitive content into private posts on social media platforms. As a result, Blogestan
lost some of its most significant bloggers as well as some aspects of its iconoclastic
spirit that had initially attracted audiences.

impact of social media (i): social networking sites
When asked about how social media and in particular social networking sites (SNSs)
have impacted their blogging activity, some bloggers stress that the line between SNSs
and blogs is not as clear as one might think. Another blogger points out that Facebook’s
Note capability may in the future evolve into a tool that would compete with blogging
platforms.

“

It is meaningless to insist that a blog must be located on Blogspot or Blogfa. The position
of the blog does not have significance. We are left with the assertion that blog is a dead
phenomenon if we signify the historical form of publication. I think blogs have switched
from the old manifestation, where they were carried in a unique URL, into becoming an
inhabitant of social media.”
The introduction and further development of SNSs impacted Blogestan in various ways,
particularly in terms of content production, according to our blogger interviews. From
a technical standpoint, a blogger has to maintain a healthy and up-to-date installation
of a Content Management System (CMS), if utilizing a self-hosted blog and a functional
theme and peripherals, including a FeedBurner connection for example. According to
bloggers, social media, on the other hand, offers a free, functional blogging platform
where traffic is guaranteed. Compared to publishing content on a blog, which potentially
requires a certain level of technical expertise—for example, if the blogger wants to
embed a YouTube video—social media offers a ready-made and amateur-friendly
environment with low barriers to participation.
Interviewees also describe how in the early years, blog content was primarily text-based,
which meant bloggers became known for their skills in producing written content. SNSs
have facilitated the use of images and videos, allowing users to quickly post audiovisual
content that often attracts more viewers.

“
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These days, people get more attention for a picture of their new haircut than what
we would get back in the years when we posted a blog post that we had spent a significant
amount of time working on.”
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“

SNSs also encourage the production of short, pointed, emotionally-charged, and
“sophisticated-looking” pieces at the expense of longer, more analytical, intellectual blog
posts.

It does not make sense to write a long blog post, just utter it in a Facebook status update,
where you are always right because you are vague, and then you will receive a hundred
likes.”
An interviewee compares SNSs to “fast food,” explaining, “I would spend a significant
amount of time producing content for my blog and then I would receive one comment,
whereas I can post a shorter piece on the social media, on which I’ve spent less time,
and still I’ll get 100 likes and 100 comments.” Other bloggers also point out that novelty
is a requirement in Blogestan, whereas reusing/reposting available content on SNSs is
common practice. This puts bloggers at a disadvantage with the rest of social media
users, as their less frequently updated content is in competition with an ocean of reused
and reposted content.
Content producers in Blogestan have to rethink the promotion strategies for their blogs
in light of new possibilities and growing SNS audiences. One interviewed blogger states
that he shares selected pieces of content as soon as they are published. Another blogger
created Facebook pages and groups and shares the content of his blog posts in their
entirety on social media sites. In describing the dramatic impact of such strategies, one
blogger explains, “People read the post on Facebook and left their comment there. It
did not make sense for them to do an extra click and write their comment underneath
the post. As soon as the first comment was posted on Facebook, the rest followed. The
social media now owned the item.” Following that logic, and taking into account that
most SNSs dissolve content, which makes content retrieval difficult after time passes,
the remaining function of blogs from the perspective of bloggers is to “merely be an
archive.”

“

Blogs have now become the personal archives of individuals. It is a common practice now
that an individual would set up a blog in order to keep track of his writings elsewhere.”
Bloggers we interviewed report that from the content consumer’s perspective, SNSs
provide a more homogeneous experience. Buttons and links are always in the same
location, independent of what content one may be looking at on Facebook, Twitter, and
Google+. In contrast, every blog has its own theme, locations for links, archive, etc. The
comment section underneath a post may request the user to enter several pieces of
information, whereas all these operations are seamless on any given SNS. Additionally,
many blogs lack a proper mobile version, according to bloggers. The text may become
unreadable and the images may not scale properly when a blog is browsed on a
smartphone. With the rising use of smartphones, audiences are understandably having a
harder time accessing blog content compared to content on social media. Blogs for the
most part still require a larger display and a keyboard for content production.
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“

Audience interaction over blogs is also quantitatively different, according to bloggers
in our sample. The absence of elements such as “like” and “plus” requires interested
audience members to type a response, usually requiring approval from the blogger.
Social media accelerated this process.

Content is delivered to its audience in matters of seconds on social media, something which
took hours in Blogestan.”
Several bloggers, however, emphasize the positive impact of social media, such as how
these platforms enable them to satisfy members of their audience who want reactions
to daily events, or ‘crowdsourcing’ ideas: “I get some feedback and people would add or
remove from the idea. Sometimes I end up writing a blog post about the idea, which has
now been ironed out and described more clearly,” according to an interviewed blogger.

impact of social media (ii): blogrolling.com
and Gooder
Interviewees also stress how technological shifts and the closure of popular blog feed
and feed aggregator services have negatively impacted the Persian blogosphere. The
blog feed platform BlogRolling was a tool through which readers on one blog were
alerted when other blogs on the blogroll published new content. BlogRolling.com also
acted as a kind of currency in Blogestan: the more a blog was added to the blogrolls of
other blogs, the more this increased its potential readership. Having another blogger
on your blogroll was as a sign of mutual respect and companionship. According to one
blogger: “My audience was the same group whose writings I read.[...] I had them on my
blogroll and they had me on their blogroll.” When Blogrolling.com shut down its service
in late 2010, bloggers were forced to utilize Yahoo! Pipes, which required more elaborate
programming.

“

I knew everyone on my blogroll. Identities were real, not artificial, as they are now.”
According to our sample, blog feeds and feed aggregators were important components
of Blogestan in a number of ways, and Google’s shut down of Google Reader (‘Gooder’
as Iranians called it) in 2013 hit especially hard. These tools removed the need to
regularly browse individual blog addresses for new content, and many of them were
accessible on platforms other than a personal computer. Server-based feed aggregators,
such as Google Reader, functioned as a kind of circumvention tool, allowing their Iranbased users to read content from filtered blogs, as the aggregation of content was
conducted on servers outside Iran and was therefore free of the limitations imposed on
the Internet inside Iran. Feed aggregators also allowed access to blog content outside
the blog’s template. This way, one was able to read the content of a post without having
to wait for the entire blog to load—an important feature in Iran’s speed-restricted
environment.
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“

Moreover, bloggers report how they were able to acquire information about the
readership of their blog through feed aggregators and third-party tools, such as Feed
Burner, which was used to maintain and groom blog feeds and inform bloggers about
their feed’s popularity. Google Reader allowed its users to post comments underneath
aggregated pieces of content and to interact with others. In effect, Google Reader had
become a private social network centered on blogging and populated by many bloggers
and mature blog readers. This blog-focused enclave dissolved in the cacophony of social
media when Google Reader was shut down, forcing content from Blogestan to compete
against other forms of content, and losing some of its interactive capacities in the
process.

No one really writes a comment anymore, and even if they do, the comments are lost in
social media. When Gooder was around, that was where the comments would be left,
and the bloggers would know that.”
The bloggers interviewed also say that the closure of Google Reader and BlogRolling
disrupted important connections between bloggers, who used to be able to re-route
some of their traffic to others through their blog roll, thus performing community
building. Around the same time, the general volume of traffic in Blogestan dropped
as readers began following links on social media. Re-routed traffic, which served
as a kind of currency in Blogestan, is no longer as prevalent, which has weakened
blogger-to-blogger connections.

“

I would post a link to a blog on my blog and the traffic on that blog would suddenly jump
from 10 to 1,000. This gave both me and the blogger a buzz. I was capable of sending out
traffic, and this meant that I mattered. On the receiving end there was a blogger who was
catapulted into fame. Both parties gained something. We do not have this anymore.
We helped others to be seen and they helped us to be seen. These attitudes are lost now.”

impact of social media (iii): From sobhaneh
to balatarin
Aside from the aggregators mentioned above, other tools played key roles in helping
Persian bloggers measure and increase traffic to their pages, according to our blogger
interviews. One blogger mentions that in the first years of Blogestan, Yahoo! Messenger
was often used to promote their content: “Back in the day, the first thing you would do
after you published a post was to send the link to your contacts on Yahoo! Messenger.”
One of the first concrete indicators of a blog’s audience was the number of page visits.
One blogger mentions his sense of satisfaction when “105 people visited my blog in one
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“

day,” but at his blog’s most influential peak, “2,000 or 3,000 people would visit my blog
every day.” Another blogger states that his “primary” goal in blogging was to have a high
“counter.”

When I started blogging, the only thing which mattered to me was that my counter should
grow. It just mattered that the number of visitors of the blog would go up.”
Sobhaneh, a link-sharing service created by Hossein Derakhshan that allowed
administrators to post links to blogs and other sites, is considered one of the first
portals for blog content.54 A blogger describes his page visits growing exponentially
when links to his content were posted on Sobhaneh. Anecdotal evidence indicates that
prior to the introduction of the major social networks and Balatarin, Sobhaneh was one
of the most significant platforms on the Persian-language web. One blogger suggests
that choosing your title in order to attract visitors from Sobhaneh was an art form.
What Sobhaneh had started for Blogestan was continued more aggressively by Balatarin
which is a key tool for bloggers to promote blog posts and to instantly assess their
success based on the number of positive (“plus”) and negative (“minus”) votes as well as
clicks from Balatarin to their blog. One blogger states that “social media gave us new
numerical criteria in order to measure the size of a post’s audience: number of likes on
Google Reader and Facebook, how many times the post was shared on the social media,
and the number of votes on Balatarin. These were quick ways to assess how successful
a post had been in attracting the audience.”
The competitive dynamics of Balatarin motivated its users to post links that would
receive as many “pluses” as possible before disappearing among the hundreds of newly
posted links. One blogger says: “Balatarin gave birth to a generation of blogs which
produced content for Balatarin. Some of the content only made sense if you were aware
of what had gone on the day before on Balatarin.” For bloggers wanting to push their
link onto Balatarin’s “hot page” in order to get a shot of high traffic, the capacity of
the title and the short description to attract immediate attention of readers became
more important than the thoughtfulness of content. This process, which we call the
“Balatarinization of Blogestan,” favored provocative, polemical, and extreme content
over the thoughtful intellectualism of early Blogestan. This also produced a countermovement against Balatarin among some bloggers: the statement “do not link content
from this blog in Balatarin” can be seen on several blogs at the time of this report’s
writing.

“
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I think Balatarin was one of the most important driving forces for political blogs.
It has since succumbed to the thrill of controversy, though.”

54 Often referred to as Iran’s “blogfather,” Derakhshan, a
Canadian-Iranian blogger, was sentenced to 19 years in
jail in 2010. He is currently imprisoned in Tehran.
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socio-political changes
Interviewed bloggers describe how content produced in Blogestan underwent a
transition from personal and private matters to essay-style analysis. Bloggers use terms
such as “a film I had watched,” “an interesting conversation I had with someone,” and
“my own relationships” to describe the themes of the pieces they published around 2005.
Later, however, these themes were modified. According to bloggers we interviewed, the
political climate under President Khatami had a significant influence on Blogestan, as
many bloggers abandoned their initial, more confessional focus on personal opinions and
experiences. President Khatami’s two presidential terms (1997-2005) included both the
rise of the reformist narrative and its collision with the conservative political current,
politicizing Blogestan. One blogger describes her transition from being a chronicler of
her own personal experiences into “an analyst of socio-political conditions.” Another
blogger maintains that it became increasingly “taboo” to discuss “your own pathetic life,
when students had been beaten up in the dormitory of the University of Tehran.” During
this critical period of socio-political change, the once prominent topics in Blogestan
became less popular as audiences demanded more current event analysis, whether or
not this was the blogger’s primary interest or focus.
In the early years of Blogestan, the podium to discuss off-limits or ignored issues
was an attractive novelty. Authorities had not yet started filtering the Internet and
the conversation on the web was essentially uninterrupted. Blogestan had a strong
monopoly over content on the Persian-language web, according to bloggers interviewed
for this report. The rise of social media meant that bloggers suddenly had to share their
audience with hundreds of thousands of new participants who became new content
producers, impacting bloggers’ sense of being exceptional and motivation to blog.

“

It used to be a big thing to be a blogger. It isn’t anymore. Everyone is talking now.”
One well-known blogger interviewed for this study mentions that during his first two
years of exposure to Blogestan, he would passionately read blogs but avoid contributing.
He says: “It took me a long time before I could have the courage to approach the
Mount Olympus of Blogestan and consider myself worthy of joining it as a producer,
as opposed to the silent consumer that I was.” This statement typifies how audiences
gradually transitioned into playing a stronger content production role and contributed to
the shifts in conversational dynamics online.
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Conclusion: The Future of Blogestan
From its inception, Blogestan has been driven and shaped by changing socio-political
conditions and technological developments. The early Persian blogosphere flourished
as an alternative, unregulated space for expression outside the restrictions of
mainstream discourse as Internet use exploded among Iran’s majority youth and techsavvy population. In later years, the Persian blogosphere morphed under intensified
state pressures and regulations as the spread of new, more streamlined social media
platforms began to outpace and replace blogs among both bloggers and readers. As our
research shows, these factors, collectively, have significantly altered the participatory
dynamics, experimental character and potency of the early Blogestan scene.
These changes raise key questions about the future of the Persian blogosphere. Some
interviewed bloggers seem pessimistic about Blogestan’s survival—especially as social
networking sites are reshaping the online ecosystem of the Persian blogosphere and
beyond. Our data indeed supports the notion of an overall decline in blogging activities
as well as a high level of blog abandonment since 2008, in part as a result of the
increase in social networking sites.
Other facts, however, give a more positive prognosis: nearly all survey participants are
still reading blogs; hence if there was indeed some change in blog reading habits over
the years, there is no clear pattern of slowdown in blog consumption. Likewise, many
bloggers disagree with the “end of history” notion regarding Blogestan and believe
that cyberspace is young, evolving and prone to new developments. For instance, John
Kelly, in the Forward of this report, maintains that although external factors did have
an effect on Blogestan, its overall structure has remained remarkably constant over the
years, despite a significant turnover and replacement rate among blogs.
Other bloggers also suggest that Blogestan, to survive, will likely need to abandon
the now- antiquated, tech-heavy blogging platforms and adapt to new, more efficient
technologies by integrating, rather than competing against, the advances of social
networking. To some, it is increasingly evident that the early manifestation of Blogestan
is no longer a viable model, and that Blogestan’s future depends in part on its ability
to mobilize the capacities of social networking that are constantly re-generating new
avenues of communications.
Yet beyond new technologies, Blogestan’s ability to retain its influence and relevance
within in the socio-political discourse in Iran depends too on its continuing capacity to
provide dynamic and pluralistic content that nourishes the public sphere.
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The audience survey involved a 27-question survey of blog readers. Most questions
focused on blog consumption habits and how these have developed over time. Previous
research shows that there is a significant overlap between readers of blogs and active
bloggers, which is why we also included five questions targeted at blog readers who
also have their own blog, in order to observe the development of blogging habits in
conjunction with reading habits.
The survey was created with Google Forms and then distributed to a vast network
of bloggers by emailing, Facebook, Twitter, and Google+. The survey was targeted at
blog users both inside Iran and outside Iran; responses were collected anonymously for
security reasons. The audience survey did not attempt to cover the whole spectrum of
Iranian Internet users, blog readers and bloggers, but rather to identify trends within
Blogestan audiences through a broad sample of users. In total, between July 25 and
August 8, 2013, 165 people responded to the survey, with the following demographic
breakdown:

ANNex FiGure 1. SAmPLe demOGrAPHiCS
FEMALE
32.1%

5160
0.6%
4150
4.2%
3140

NOT PRECISED
1.8%
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36.4%
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For the full Audience Survey as well as the raw data,
please contact the authors of this report.
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Web crawling methodology
To complement the quantitative data of the audience survey, we used automated
web crawling techniques to better understand the evolution of Persian blogs over
time. Our objective was to assess the connection between factors such as domestic
filtering, political orientation, historical trends, or the hosting platform. In order to have
a benchmark snapshot of a relevant portion of Blogestan dating back to the 2000s,
we contacted the authors of the “Persian Blogosphere Crawler Report.”56 However,
the original dataset had been lost following the close-down of the Tehran-based
organization by the authorities in 2007.
The dataset collected for “Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the
Persian Blogosphere” was on the other hand still available, and the authors of that
report kindly offered to share it for further study.57 In addition, they also suggested that
we make the most of similar datasets that had been constituted between 2009 and
2012, which had not been published.58
Due to the methodology used to select these active and prominent blogs, the size of
the sample differs according to year and ranges between 6,061 blogs to 9,121. Also,
it is important to note that these yearly samples overlap for a total of 24,205 distinct
addresses aggregated across the five measurements, with 2012 being the most unique.
In the table below we indicate the total number of blogs for each yearly sample, the
number of blogs present for the first time any given year, and the blogs present in one
sample only.

ANNex FiGure 2. BLOG SAmPLe
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

TOTAL NUMBER OF BLOGS FOR EACH YEARLY SAMPLE

6,061

8,092

9,121

7,665

7,471

BLOGS NOT PRESENT IN PREVIOUS SAMPLES

n/a

2,620

5,715

3,553

6,256

BLOGS ONLY PRESENT IN THIS SAMPLE

574

1,188

3,079

3,357

6,256

Every blog of each yearly sample was attached to a topical category (or attentive
clusters) using human examination and a computational analysis of the frequencies of
words and phrases. In the initial report by Kelly and Etling, the categories were: “secular/
reformist,” “conservative/religious,” “Persian poetry and literature,” “mixed networks.”
This last category gathered blogs focused on sports, celebrity, and minority cultures.

56

Iran Civil Society
Organization Training and
Research Center (ICTRC),
2006.

57
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Kelly and Etling, 2008.

58

The datasets gather
Persian blogs that have
been identified each year
as the most active and
prominent. According to
John Kelly: “The selection
of each yearly list involved

several filters such as
recentness of publication
and minimum degree
requirements. It relies on
social network analysis,
not case/attribute data.
So, this is not sampling. It

represents the most active
and connected part of the
blogosphere, and what’s
missing is just the poorly
connected and mostly
inactive long tail.”
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In the samples from 2009 to 2012, the number of clusters was increased but metacategories remained stable, which allowed us to identify “opposition/reformist/
secular” and “conservative/religious/CyberShia” blogs. To simplify the presentation of
the findings, we decided to refer to the former group as “reformist” and to the latter
as “conservative.” We gathered all the other clusters, including Persian poetry and
literature, and mixed networks, under the label “other clusters.”
Using the datasets presented above, we also collected the following additional data:
Blog Status and Blog Activity
These traits correspond respectively to the questions “is each blog in our different
sets still online?” and “what are the dates of the last publications from each blog?” Our
datasets contained blogs distributed unevenly across seven hosting platforms. Each
required different approaches to aggregating activity, with user modifications and
themes creating idiosyncrasies on data collection, even within the same platform.59
Blog Filtering
Our second data collection endeavor focused on the accessibility of the blogs from
inside Iran. One limitation of this collection was that no dataset exists that would
indicate the accessibility of a site in Iran at any given time, limiting our ability to create
time-series based analysis. Therefore, we could only assess whether each site was
blocked at the date of the test, at the end of September 2013. In addition, we could
determine the accessibility of sites regardless of whether the actual site was live or not.
It has previously been determined that Iran’s web censorship partially occurs based on
whether the “Host” HTTP header or the page address requested match a blacklist.60 The
censorship apparatus is agnostic to what the host on the other end actually is and can

59

42

To ascertain the status
of each blog, the script
first attempted to connect
to the URL and retrieve
its front page. Based on
previous observations,
this script initially
checked as to whether the
content contains strings
associated with platform
error messages such as
those associated with
site deletion or violations
of terms of use. The
script and researchers
also performed checks to
determine if the host was
still responsive or whether
the domain appeared to
have lapsed. The status
values included: ‘not found’
or ‘unavailable,’ ‘deleted’ or
‘disabled,’ ‘empty,’ ‘private,’

‘moved,’ or ‘filtered.’
While these errors may
potentially have resulted
from the same causes, such
as a blog being deleted
because it had violated
the terms of service or
local laws (otherwise
coded as filtered), we were
limited to the attribution
provided by the platform.
Therefore, where we could
not differentiate whether
a user or authorities had
removed a blog in the error
message, we disaggregated
these cases to treat them
differently from those
where attribution was clear.
To evaluate the activity
of each blog, the script
first attempted to find its
RSS feed via an analysis

of the HTML code of the
frontpage. If no such tag
was found, a best guess
of the location for the
feed was made based on
prior observations of the
blogging platform. If both
methods failed, then the
front page and archive
pages were searched
for HTML tags identified
as likely containing
timestamps for posts. An
attempt was then made
to parse potential date
strings based on Jalil or
Gregorian date format. To
allow for the quantitative
analysis of the result
of the data collection
activity, we decided to
label any blog still online
as “active” that had least

five posts published during
the previous 12 months,
or that had at least one
post published every three
months in the past twelve
months. We included this
second criterion in order
to take into account blogs
for which we could only
retrieve data on the overall
activity per month using
archive analysis.
60 Simurgh Aryan,
Homa Aryan, and J. Alex
Halderman, “Internet
Censorship in Iran: A First
Look,” Free and Open
Communications on the
Internet, 2013, https://www.
usenix.org/conference/
foci13/workshop-program/
presentation/aryan.
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be tested through a forged request to a control server. This forged request will trigger
the same set of filtering rules as if the traffic were directed for the real end destination,
so long as it traverses the international gateway. This approach allows a researcher
to send headers to a site that should return a predetermined string in response to any
request. This test was built on the OONI network interference testing framework.61
Blog Takedowns
Technical limitations on the accessibility of blogs by the filtering apparatus only reflects
one aspect of the state censorship of Blogestan. Most Persian blogs (92 percent of our
sample) are hosted on platforms managed by companies established in Iran or subject
to regulations of the Iranian government, and, therefore, appear to respond to takedown
requests from Iranian authorities. From the authorities’ perspective, the benefit of
takedowns compared to mere filtering is that the former cannot be accessed with
circumvention tools. Additionally, since much of the country’s content filtering occurs
at the international gateway, platforms hosted in country are not able to be filtered
directly.62
In order to collect data on blog takedowns, we relied on Archive’s Wayback Machine,
which retrieves and stores large sections of content on the Internet for the purposes of
maintaining historical records, including the blogs within our sample. Archive presents
a “memento” API service, which is a standard that allows for a program to easily move
between different archived copies of the site. We used this API to detect abnormal
decreases in the size of successive archives and to spot removal messages on the front
page of each blog. In doing so, we were able to track down an approximate historical
period for the takedown or abandonment of numerous blogs hosted on Persianlanguage blogging platforms.

61

OONI developer
documentation: https://
ooni.torproject.org/docs/.
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(@alirezashirazi),
“The filtering system
cannot block domestic
websites,” 3 June 2013,

https://twitter.com/
alirezashirazi/status/341532866871709696.
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ANNex FiGure 3. FrequeNCy OF BLOG FiLTeriNG ANd remOvALS BASed ON HOSTiNG
PLATFOrm ANd AFFiLiATiON CLuSTerS

reformist

other
clusters

704

5,825

4,375

14,005

16%

3%

24%

18%

58%

1,100

668

4,435

1,816

10,504

7%

4%

26%

11%

63%

154

0

202

566

1,545

7%

0%

9%

24%

67%

1,721

0

13

899

838

98%

0%

1%

51%

48%

44

11

809

7

23

98%

0%

1%

51%

3%

31

18

117

34

278

7%

4%

27%

8%

65%

70

1

46

126

201

19%

0%

12%

34%

54%

352

0

14

285

68

96%

0%

4%

78%

19%

11

0

0

11

4

73%

0%

0%

73%

27%

0

0

0

7

3

0%

0%

0%

70%

30%

0

0

5

0

2

0%

0%

71%

0%

29%

0

0

3

0

4

0%

0%

43%

0%

57%

0

0

3

0

0

0%

0%

100%

0%

0%

total

Filtered

removed

ALL

24,205

3,780

BLOGFA

PERSIANBLOG

BLOGSPOT

PARSIBLOG

MIHANBLOG

BLOGSKY

WORDPRESS

MALAKUT

AKKASEE

PARSIBLOG

Myblog

PARSIYAR

44

conservative

platform

16,755

2,313

1,750

839

429

373

367

15

10

7

7

3

hosted
in

USA

USA

USA

Iran

Iran

USA

USA

USA

Iran

Iran

France

Iran
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Bloggers who could be considered influential were selected to ensure they had both
extensive experience with blogging as well as knowledge about Blogestan in general.
Selected individuals had to have been active members of Blogestan sometime during
the past ten year period. They had to have participated in different roles in order to
assure broad understanding of Blogestan, such as being active blog readers, and have
experience with social media so as to have an informed view of its impact on Blogestan.
The list of bloggers to interview was further refined during the selection process, based
on representativeness and availability, and limited to twenty individuals. Eleven were
based inside Iran and nine had moved outside the country after they started blogging.
Eleven of the interviewed bloggers were female and nine were male. Seventeen bloggers
had continued to blog, however, with different frequencies, and three had stopped
blogging for different reasons.
The selected bloggers were contacted through email or a message on Google+ or
Facebook and interview questions were delivered either over email or through a video
conversation over Google Chat or Skype. The bloggers were given complete control of
the time and method of communication in order to satisfy their security requirements.
The interviews were carried out between June 20 and September 12, 2013. Respondents
were asked 19 questions covering the Internet, social media, personal context, political
context as well as additional open-ended questions.
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63 For the full interview script as well as an explanation
of the intent of each question given to bloggers, please
contact the report authors.

